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Introduction
Spatial models of voting have dominated mathematical political theory since the seminal work of Downs (1957) . The Downsian model assumes that each elector votes on the basis of his utility function which depends only on the distance between his preferred policy platform and the ones proposed by candidates. If candidates act strategically so as to maximize the share of their votes, then proposed platforms will converge to the preferred platform of the median voter, according to the median voter theorem. Given that empirical tests of this prediction support the view that some divergence in proposed platforms occurs (Poole and Rosenthal 1984) , various attempts have been made to propose simple and tractable extensions of the Downsian utility function in order to predict political differentiation. In particular, and following an early suggestion by Stokes (1963) , a succession of papers introduce "valence" issues into the model, i.e. candidates' characteristics which are independent of the platforms they propose (e.g., charisma, rhetoric). All these models have the desirable properties: they are simple extensions of the Downsian model and they show that the convergence to the median is no longer guaranteed if we introduce a simple candidate-specific parameter, which reflects the valence index into the Downsian utility function. In short, convergence to the median closely depends on which utility function is chosen. However, empirical tests of the Downsian model test predictions of the model, e.g. convergence to the median, the existence of strategic voting, but not the assumptions made. In particular, very little is known about which of the existing utility functions used in Downsian models is the most empirically founded. This is an important criterion, because one might easily believe that considering microfounded utility functions that are empirically realistic lead to better predictions.
With these concerns in mind, this paper uses a unique survey run by the Société We find that existing valence utility functions are doing only slightly better than the Downsian one, despite the addition of free parameters. However, a strong empirical regularity emerges. This leads us to propose a new utility function with valence, the partisan valence utility function. This new utility function fits the data particulary well and clearly outperforms existing ones. Let us briefly describe the main properties of the partisan valence. Existing models suppose that a valence advantage enhances the utility of all voters simultaneously (e.g., everyone is better off if a candidate is less corrupt). Similarly, the partisan valence considers that voters unanimously agree that a candidate has some objective characteristics. However, the partisan valence supposes that an increase in a candidate's valence may be good news for his supporters, but bad news for his opponents. Thus, valence characteristics are unanimously recognized but, in sharp contrast to existing models, they have a different impact on the utility of voters according to their position on the political spectrum. As an example, think of the ability of a candidate to implement his platform. Every voter may recognize that a candidate is efficient at transforming his campaign promises into public policy. This will increase the utility of the agents whose preferred platforms are near the candidate proposed platform, but decrease the utility of the other agents.
So far, very little empirical work has been devoted to the analysis of valence models. To date, only Grose and Husser (2008) have proposed an empirical study on valence advantage that a candidate has over another candidate. More precisely, they focus on candidates' ability to communicate with voters via campaign rhetoric. Given that this ability is a nonpolicy advantage, they examine campaign rhetoric as a valence dimension. However, they do not test the empirical accuracy of the form of the utility functions. This is the aim of our paper.
Our work has two potential limitations. First, there are alternative specifications for the voters utility functions that are not considered here. They are based on the idea that some of the basic elements used in the spatial model are only known with some uncertainty (e.g., platforms are not perfectly observed).
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But introducing uncertainty implies additional assumptions about risk aversion that can hardly be tested, at least with the SOFRES survey. Second, it is not possible to estimate on the basis of the SOFRES survey whether parties adopt optimal positions. Indeed, the considered election is a two-round election involving more than two candidates. Voters then may vote strategically, by choosing not to vote for their preferred candidate.
3
This is precisely why we use the SOFRES survey. This survey elicits the utility of each voter prior to the election if a given candidate is elected. Thus, it avoids biases due to strategic voting that would have prevailed if we had used a survey that elicited stated voting decisions.
4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the existing models of valence and introduces the partisan valence model. We explain some econometrics in Section 3. This is followed by a description of the data and the estimation results in Section 4, and concluding remarks in Section 5.
Modeling valence
In existing models, the term "valence" usually defines a characteristic of candidates that is universally appreciated. A greater valence thus implies that all voters are better off. This is the reason why valence is often described as a valence advantage. . Explicitly modeling the process of valence formation allows one to take into account an endogenous determination of valence advantages. Candidates can choose a level of effort that (stochastically) increases 3 Strategic voting occurs when elections involve more than two candidates. For instance, in a three party election a strategic voting might occur because a voter votes for his second most preferred party if his preferred party is unlikely to win and if there is a close contest between the second and third ranked parties. 4 Alvarez and Nagler (1998, 2000) highlight that this problem is often neglected despite the fact that most elections involve more than two candidates. They consider the British general election survey that elicits stated voting decisions, and propose an approach for taking account of strategic voting (see in particular Alvarez and Nagler 2000). However, if most elections involve more than two candidates in the World, remark that elections are dominated by two parties in the United States (US). So one might reasonably ask why we do not use the CPS US presidential election survey (used for instance by Rosenthal and Poole 1984). It is because there has been a rise of third candidate challengers even in the US, as pointed out by Alvarez and Nagler (2000, pp.58-60). They note that estimates of strategic voting for the 1988 US presidential primary are in the vicinity of 14 per cent. be related to a strategic use of imprecision (Tanve 2008) . Our primary goal in this paper is to estimate the added value of valence models in terms of empirical estimation. We will thus not try to explain the origin of valence.
Existing models
We assume that M candidates compete for an election. A candidate j proposes a policy platform x j that belongs to the policy space X = R n . A voter i can be identified with his preferred platform, or bliss point a i ∈ R n . If candidate j is elected, the utility function of voter i is a decreasing function of the distance between x j and a i .
-The simplest model is the Downsian model, where the utility of voter i if candidate j is elected can be written as:
-The additive model is the most popular model of valence advantage. It consists in adding a constant b j to the utility function that depends on the considered candidate j.
b 1 > b 2 means that candidate 1 has a non policy-dependent advantage over candidate 2, for example because he has more charisma, or is more good-looking on TV.
-The multiplicative model was recently developed in Hollard and Rossignol (2008) . Valence now takes the form of a multiplicative constant θ j that depends on the considered candidate j. :
θ 1 > θ 2 means that candidate 1 has a policy-dependent advantage over candidate 2, for example because he is seen as more competent in economies issues or in foreign affairs.
Note that the effect of the valence advantage now interacts with the distance.
The partisan valence model
A Let x j be the platform proposed by a given candidate j. Now, consider a voter i whose preferred platform a i is closed to x j , i.e., who is rather partisan of j (say ||x j − a i || < K).
If j is elected, the higher the intensity valence λ j of j, the happier voter i, since j will be efficient to implement the policy x j . On the contrary, if a i is far from
the higher the intensity valence λ j , the less happy voter i. We denote by C the utility level of voters who are not affected by the valence index λ j . This justifies the following form for the utility function:
This partisan valence can be seen as a mixture of the additive and multiplicative valence.
To make clear this point, let us consider the following general model that combines additive 
Econometric models
This section presents our empirical strategy to test if the Downsian or one of the valence utility types is empirically valid, i.e. if one of them fits well with the data. Our approach to test the hypotheses of these different theoretical utilities is to formulate a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model that contains the hypotheses as restrictions on its parameters.
The four theoretical utility types described in Section 2 have testable implications given that they imply different testable restrictions on the following utility type:
Let us assume that we have N voters, i = 1, ..., N , and M candidates, j = 1, ..., M , who compete at a mass election. Given the data at our disposal (described in the following section), we know U ij , i.e., voter i's subjective utility if candidate j wins the election, as well as his ideal point, a i , and the policy position of candidate j, x j , for every i and j.
Stacking all M utilities for the ith voter, we get the following system of equations:
. . .
where
M )} could be estimated separately by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the N observations. However, our empirical strategy is to estimate these M equations jointly, i.e. via a SUR model, for two reasons. First, and as will be clear below, the four theoretical utility types that we will test impose some cross-equation parameter restrictions on the system of equations (6). Thus, estimating the M equations separately will waste the information that some identical parameters appear in the M equations. Secondly, the disturbances can be correlated across the M levels of utility. For instance, the knowledge that individual i prefers left-wing politicians gives some information about his preference for right-wing politicians. If this is the case, an OLS system will be consistent but not efficient, because it will not consider the correlation between errors associated with the M equations.
In our SUR model, the errors associated with the dependent variables may be correlated. More precisely, we assume that disturbances are uncorrelated across observations but correlated across equations. To put this in a familiar context, the disturbance formulation is:
where ε, here, is the vector of disturbances of the system of equations. Given that there are M equations and N observations, ε is a column vector with M N elements. For the ith observation, Σ is the M ×M covariance matrix of the disturbances of the M equations, and σ js is the covariance between equation j and equation s. We estimate the SUR model via the asymptotic efficient iterated feasible generalized least squares (IFGLS) procedure that
gives maximum likelihood estimates. This procedure necessitates the use of a consistently estimated disturbance covariance matrixΣ at each iteration.
5
As already stated, the four theoretical models that we will test impose some crossequation restrictions on the SUR model (6) . The first theoretical utility type, the Downsian one, implies the following testable restrictions on the unconstrained model (6):
The additive valence utility type imposes the following hypothesis:
The theoretical multiplicative valence utility type corresponds to the null hypothesis:
Lastly, the partisan valence utility type implies the following testable restriction on the unconstrained model (6):
Note that the partisan valence utility type hypothesis imposes nonlinear restrictions on the linear model (6) . As a consequence, the model (6) becomes nonlinear.
Note that these restrictions (8) , (9), (10), (11) are equivalent to the theoretical models (1), (2), (3), (4) This is innocuous as long as we consider these utility functions as 5 Two remarks are in order. First, one might ask why we do not consider a direct maximization by simply inserting Σ in a log-likelihood function. The advantage of direct likelihood estimation is lost when the SUR is nonlinear, as Greene (2003, p.371) points out. And one of the constrained models that we will estimate imposes nonlinear constraints on the unconstrained model 6. Secondly, one might note that efficient estimation in a multivariate regression model only requires a consistent estimator of Σ. The least square residuals are used to estimate consistently Σ, soσ js = 1 N N i=1ε ijεis . IFGLS is maximum likelihood that usesσ js to obtain an estimator of Σ at each iteration (for more details, see Greene, 2003 , pp.211-212 and pp.344-350).
ordinal ones. In particular, the set of voters who support a given candidate is not affected by such transformations of the utility functions. The values of these parameters depend on the specifications of the survey, e.g. we use a 0 to 10 scale.
Application

The data
The data used in this paper are drawn from a French pre-electoral survey 2007 of 3826 persons. It was produced by the CEVIPOF, and carried out by SOFRES. It took place just before the 2007 presidential election, between March 12th and April 21th. The sample was structured to be representative of the French population above 18, the legal voting age in France. 8 This sample is called the original sample in Table 1 , where descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper are presented. As one can see, some persons interviewed refused to answer the questions. Furthermore, some answers are unsuitable for our purpose, as will become clearer later. As a consequence, our estimation sample is composed of 2460 respondents, as shown in Table 1 . We do not believe that these missing and unsuitable observations bias our results, as the summary statistics in the original and estimation samples look very similar. As we will see, we focus our analysis on the three candidates considered as the main ones before the election: Ségolène Royal, the socialist party candidate; Francois Bayrou, the candidate of the center-right party "Union pour la démocratie française"; and Nicolas Sarkozy, the candidate of the right-wing political party "Union pour un mouvement populaire". These three candidates gathered more than 75% of the votes in the first round; and prior to the election, it was expected that two of them would run for the second round, but there was uncertainty as to which ones. Sarkozy enjoyed a commanding lead in the polls, but Royal was trailing behind the third candidate, Bayrou. Finally, Royal and Sarkozy were the two candidates that got the best scores, and
7 The French presidential election is a two-round vote. A candidate is elected in the first round if he gets more than 50% of the votes. If no candidate gets at least 50% of the votes, the two candidates who get the most votes run for the second round. The one who gets a majority in this run-off is elected. The 2007 election had eleven candidates running for the first round that took place on 22 April 2007 (so the survey was run before the first round).
8 Non-registered voters were excluded. 9 The loss of observations caused by missing or unsuitable answers is around 35% 3826−2460 2460
.
were selected to run for the second round that took place on 6 May. Sarkozy won with 53% of the vote.
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We have three key pieces of information in this survey:
• Respondent i's subjective utility levels whether Royal (U ir ), Bayrou (U ib ) or Sarkozy (U is ) were elected.
• a subjective position for each of these candidates on a left/right axis (the x ir , x ib and x is variables).
• the respondents' positions on a left-right political spectrum (the a i variable). ii.The estimation sample includes all the respondents in the original sample, other than those who have missing values for the variables in our econometric models (estimated in Table 2 ).
Respondent's ideal point: "Concerning your political opinion, where would you place yourself on the political spectrum?" [1] extreme-left, [2] left, [3] center-left, [4] center, [5] center-right, [6] right, [7] extreme-right, [8] anarchist, [9] don't know, [0] refused 126 persons [0] refused to answer. 981 respondents answered that [9] they had no political opinion and 21 that they were [8] anarchist. These answers are unsuitable for our econometric analysis because these respondents did not give an explicit preferred policy platform. We thus drop from the survey all of these 1128 (= 981 + 126 + 21) persons and have a sample of 2698 respondents who provided an explicit position on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is extreme left and 7 extreme-right. This variable is denoted a i in Table 1 . Given that this self-position is shown on a 1 to 7 scale, while candidates are located using a 0 to 10 scale, a transformation has to be made to compute the distance between the voter's bliss point and the candidates' locations. We rescale voters' bliss points between 0 and 10 as such:
We then compute the distance as d ij = |a i − x ij |. It means that we assume that the utility functions are linear in distance. This is defensible but admittedly arbitrary. We set a major part of these concerns aside for the moment. 
Estimation results
11
The 1 percent critical value is 11.34, so the hypothesis that the disturbances of the three equations are uncorrelated is rejected.
11 The Breusch-Pagan statistic is distributed as χ 2 with M (M − 1)/2 degrees of freedom. In our application, M = 3, so this statistic has 3 degrees of freedom. Column [1] . Indeed, the likelihood ratio test statistic is 97.434.
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The 1 per cent critical 12 A likelihood ratio test is twice the difference between the log-likelihood functions of the unconstrained and constrained models (2 × (−17392.452 − (−17441.169)) = 97.434). It is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the reduction in the number of parameters that results from value from the chi-squared distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is 13.28, so the hypothesis that the parameters in all three equations are equal is rejected. As a consequence, the Downsian utility type is not supported by the empirical evidence.
Model [3] is the SUR model where agents have additive valence utility type (Ho : θ j = θ, ∀j). So there are 2 restrictions on Model [1] in our application (θ r = θ b , θ r = θ s ). First, we reject the null hypothesis that the additive valence utility type is valid: the likelihood ratio statistic, 57.88, is higher than 9.21, the 1 per cent critical value from the chi-squared table with 2 restrictions. So, similarly to the Downsian utility type, the additive valence utility type does not fit the data as well as the unrestricted model. Secondly, note that Models [2] and [3] are nested. In other words, Model [2] is not only a subset of the unrestricted model [1] : it is also obtained as a restriction on Model [3] . As a consequence, one might ask: Thus, this model is the unique constrained model that fits the data as well as the unconstrained model of Column [1] . In other words, the partisan valence utility type is the only one that is supported by the empirical evidence. 
Robustness checks
To check the robustness of these results we repeated the regressions for various specifications and methods. These results are presented in the Tables in Appendix B. First, note that the estimations in Table 2 assume that the utility functions are linear
s , K, C), so there is one degree of freedom. The 10 per cent critical value from the chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 2.71.
14 Given that restricted and unrestricted parameters were simple to calculate in the models of Table 2 , likelihood ratio tests to test the restrictions of the different models were convenient. But in complex models, the parameter vectors may be difficult to compute, particularly when nonlinear constraints are imposed, as in the partisan model. It will be the case in the last robustness check of the next subsection for reasons that will be clearly explained. A Wald test will be preferable even if this testing procedure is peculiar to the partisan valence model, as Appendix A explains; nevertheless, it provides similar results to a likelihood ratio test.
As a consequence, the specifications in Table 1 consider that the distance is
where γ is an exponent parameter, as do Poole and Rosenthal (1984, p.393) . In other words, we have assumed that the utility of voter i if party j is elected is:
The models are now nonlinear systems with 3 couples of parameters {(b r , θ
s )} as well as the coefficient γ to estimate. Two comments are in order. One can easily see that the estimated coefficientγ is not significantly different from 1 in all the specifications. 16 Thus, assuming that utility functions are linear in distance is supported by the empirical evidence. Furthermore, we show the likelihood ratio test for testing the restricted models at the bottom of each specification. Again, the unique theory that is not rejected by the data is the partisan valence theory.
We have also considered evidence relating to the model's robustness to influential data, given that we would not have liked our results to be influenced by a few data points. To detect possible influential observations, we have computed studentized residuals after the estimation of the unconstrained model in Table 2 . For each observation we have three equations {U ir , U ib , U is }, so three residuals {ε ir ,ε ib ,ε is }, and three studentized residuals.
We have used various criteria to check if our results are robust. First, if one of the three studentized residuals is higher (in absolute value) than 3, this observation is excluded in all the 5 SUR models presented in Table 2 . Five observations had at least one of their studentized residuals higher than 3.
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So the SUR models in Table 2 are estimated with 2455 15 To name but a few examples, Alvarez and Nagler (1998, pp.64-65 and p.90) assume a spatial model of voting where the utility of voter i if the jth party wins the election is a function of the squared distance between the voter's position and the party's position. In their seminal paper, Poole and Rosenthal (1984, p.393) consider an exponent parameter on the distance, and propose specifications with various prespecified values of this parameter. 16 The z ratio for the test of the hypothesis that γ equals zero is 0.141 for the partisan valence model. Thus, the null hypothesis must not be rejected at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels.
observations. Note that we have to be very concerned about studentized residuals higher than 3, but we can diminish this cutoff value. Table 3 presents estimation specifications where the cutoff value is 2.5. 71 additional observations are excluded in this Table, so the number of observations used to estimate the SUR models is 2384.
18
. Similar exercises were carried out using other criteria (not shown) and did not yield significantly different results from those of Table 2 .
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Last but not least, we have been concerned by the fact that various respondents in the survey provided utility levels that are limit values (i.e. zero or ten). 375 respondents answered that they would have had a utility level U r = 0 if Royal had won the election; 171 would have had U b = 0 if Bayrou had won and 402 U s = 0 in a Sarkozy victory. Concerning the other limit value, 245 respondents reported U r = 10, 148 had U b = 10 and 313 had U s = 10. Our SUR models of Tables 2, 1, 2 and 3 might fail to account for the qualitative difference between limit values and nonlimit values (strictly between zero and ten). To take account of this non-negligible proportion of respondents, we have estimated trivariate tobit models. There were, however, two difficulties.
There was a first practical difficulty to estimate such models because some observations are censored in the three equations of the models. The likelihood for these observations involves cumulative normal distribution of dimension three, which is a non-trivial problem.
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Fortunately, some progress has been made on the evaluation of higher than bivariate normal integrals. We have used the Roodman's (2007) conditional mixed process estimator, CMP, a module available on the STATA software, to estimate the unconstrained model in Column [1] of Table 4 .
21
We were also able to estimate the Downsian, the additive valence and which is associated with the Bayrou equation again). There is no observation with the three studentized residuals higher than 3 at the same time. 18 2460 observations are used in Table 2 . Five observations have at least one of their three studentized residuals higher than 3. 76 observations have at least one of their three studentized residuals higher than 2.5 (so 71 have at least one of their three studentized residuals between 2.5 and 3). 19 For instance, we have excluded observations which have at least two studentized residuals higher than 2.5 (7 observations are concerned) or higher than 2 (35 observations are concerned). 21 CMP computes the trivariate normal cumulative density functions that are implied by such a model with the GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) simulator. The estimates in Table 4 are obtained by this simulator, taking 200 draws per observation (for more details, see Cappellari and Jenkins 2006) . multiplicative valence models. Table 4 presents the results of all these models. We shows the likelihood ratio test for testing the restrictions implied by each model at the bottom of each specification. This testing procedure indicates that the Downsian, the additive valence and multiplicative valence are always significant, so the data reject these three theories.
The second problem concerns the partisan valence model. As already stated, the likelihood ratio test requires calculation of both restricted and unrestricted estimators. The model becomes too cumbersome to estimate if the partisan valence restrictions are imposed.
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As a consequence, a procedure similar to the one explained in Appendix A was carried out. A loop in the range 2.700 to 4.500, stepping by 0.001, was executed to obtain a Wald statistic for each of these values and to test the null hypothesis that at least one C in this range exists, such that the null hypothesis is true. Table 5 
Conclusion
So far, very few empirical papers have been devoted to valence issues, i.e. to non-policy factors. The present paper is a first step toward an empirical account of valence issues in elections. This paper has shown that traditional ways of introducing valence indices in utility functions, i.e. additively or multiplicatively, are too simple and perhaps misleading.
Indeed, we have not found empirical evidence for these utility functions. In contrast, we have proposed a theoretically derived utility function with partisan valence that has strong empirical support. This strong empirical support is probably due to the fact that, contrary to the valence in additive and multiplicative models, the valence in the partisan valence utility function has a voter-specific dimension. All voters can indeed agree that a candidate has some objective characteristics (e.g., he is really willing to implement his campaign promises). However, this can affect voters in different ways. Thus, an objective characteristic does not necessarily result in a valence advantage, whereas existing models assume that a better valence index results in a greater utility for all voters. In the partisan model, a change along the valence dimension increases the utility of some voters but at the 22 We cannot use the CMP module if nonlinear constraints are imposed on the unconstrained model. same time decreases the utility of some other ones. All in all, a consensus on candidates' characteristics leads to an increase in the political dissension among voters.
A Appendix: An alternative approach to testing the partisan valence hypothesis It is well-known that a shortcoming of the likelihood ratio test is that it requires estimation of both restricted and unrestricted parameter vectors. As far as both are simple to calculate, as in the models of Table 2 , then a likelihood ratio test to test the restrictions is convenient.
But in complex models, the parameter vectors may be much more difficult to compute, particularly when nonlinear constraints are imposed, as in the partisan model. It is the case in one robustness check of Subsection 4.3 where we estimate trivariate tobits. Given that a Wald statistic requires only the unrestricted parameter vectors, it will be preferable because it is much easier to compute. Furthermore, it is asymptotically equivalent to a likelihood ratio test. However, if one does a Wald test to test whether the restrictions of the partisan model are valid, it gives rise to a peculiar procedure.
To see that, let us assume that we want to test the partisan valence restrictions via a Wald test. The null hypothesis is H 0 :
Given that you do not have an estimated coefficient of C when you only estimate the unrestricted model, you cannot compute the Wald statistic as such.
You need to fix the coefficient C at one value, and then compute the corresponding Wald statistic. We have looped with C taking on values in the range 3 to 4.400, stepping by 0.001, to obtain a Wald statistic for each of these values. So we test if at least one C in this range exists, such that H 0 is true. In other words, the null hypothesis becomes: Table A1 presents the results for some of these values, testing this partisan valence restriction using the unrestricted parameters of Model [1] in Table 2 . The Wald statistic has a chi-squared distribution and 2 degrees of freedom because C is no more a coefficient estimate. This is the peculiarity of this procedure: it does not give the same degrees of freedom as the likelihood ratio test. The 10 per cent critical value from the chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom is 4.61. At this conventional level, we cannot reject H 0 as far as C ∈ [3.107; 4.345]. We obtain the lowest Wald statistic (0.7172343) when C = 3.881.
Thus, we conclude that at least one C exists, such that the data do not reject our theory, and note that the C that minimizes the Wald test is very close to the estimated coefficient C(= 3.873) in Column [5] of Table 2 . ii.*, ** and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% significance, respectively. iii. The Wald statistics are computed for the different values of C using the vector of parameter estimates of the unrestricted model in Column [1] of Table 2 .
B Appendix: Robustness checks ii.*, ** and *** represent 10, 5 and 1% significance, respectively. iii. The Wald statistics are computed for the different values of C using the vector of parameter estimates of the unrestricted model in Column [1] of Table 4 .
